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Abstract. Cryptographic identification schemes allow a remote user to prove his/her identity to a
verifier who holds some public information of the user, such as the user public key or identity. Most
of the existing cryptographic identification schemes are based on number-theoretic hard problems such
as Discrete Log and Factorization. This paper focuses on the design and analysis of identity based
identification (IBI) schemes based on algebraic coding theory. We first revisit an existing code-based
IBI scheme which is derived by combining the Courtois-Finiasz-Sendrier signature scheme and the Stern
zero-knowledge identification scheme. Previous results have shown that this IBI scheme is secure under
passive attacks. In this paper, we prove that the scheme in fact can resist active attacks. However,
whether the scheme can be proven secure under concurrent attacks (the most powerful attacks against
identification schemes) remains open. In addition, we show that it is difficult to apply the conventional
OR-proof approach to this particular IBI scheme in order to obtain concurrent security. We then
construct a special OR-proof variant of this scheme and prove that the resulting IBI scheme is secure
under concurrent attacks.
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Introduction

Remote user identification is one of the fundamental research topics in cryptography, and is very
useful in practice. We can separate public key user identification schemes into two categories:
standard identification (SI), and identity based identification (IBI). In a standard identification
scheme, the verifier has the public key of the prover and uses this public key to verify the genuineness
of the remote user, while in an identity based identification scheme, the verifier can perform the
verification just based on the prover’s identity.
Most of the existing identification schemes follow a three-move (or Σ-type) structure: the prover
P initiates an identification protocol by sending a commitment Cmt, then the verifier V replies with
a challenge Ch, and finally P generates a response Rsp and sends it to V who makes a final decision
which is either ‘accept’ or ‘reject’. In [1], Bellare et al. called identification schemes following such a
structure canonical identification schemes. Many canonical SI and IBI schemes have been proposed
in the literature (e.g. [1, 11, 5, 10, 14, 19, 21, 20]). The security of these schemes are based on the
intractability of several number-theoretic problems such as factorization, discrete log, and RSA.
One important application of canonical identification schemes is that we can derive a standard
?
??
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signature (SS) (or identity based signature (IBS), resp.) scheme from an SI (or IBI, resp.) scheme
via the Fiat-Shamir transformation [11].
From SI/SS to IBI. In [1], Bellare, Namprempre and Neven presented a generic framework to
transform any SI scheme satisfying certain conditions into an IBI scheme. The derived IBI scheme
will inherit the security of the underlying SI scheme. Independent to Bellare et al.’s work, in [15],
Kurosawa and Heng proposed another generic framework that transforms any standard signature
scheme, which is existentially unforgeable under adaptive chosen message attacks [13], into an IBI
scheme secure against passive adversaries. In [24], Yang et al. further showed that in order to achieve
passive security, a standard signature scheme secure under known message attacks suffices.
Code-based Cryptography. The first code-based public key cryptosystem was proposed by
McElliece [17] in 1978. A variant of the McElliece cryptosystem was later proposed by Niederreiter
in [18]. In Asiacrypt 2001, Courtois, Finiasz and Sendrier [8] proposed the first practical code-based
digital signature scheme by applying the Full Domain Hash [2, 3] to the Niederreiter cryptosystem.
The advantage of using algebraic coding theory to construct cryptographic schemes is that these
schemes may remain secure even in the post-quantum age.
SI/IBI Based on Algebraic Coding Theory. In [23], Stern proposed a standard identification
scheme based on the syndrome decoding problem from algebraic coding theory. However, the Stern
identification scheme is not canonical. It requires 3r communications rounds between the prover and
the verifier where r is a system parameter. Several variants of the scheme are also introduced in [23],
including an identity based one. However, no formal security proof was provided for this IBI scheme.
In [7, 6], Cayrel et al. proposed an new IBI scheme which can be regarded as the combination of a
modified version of the Courtois-Finiasz-Sendrier (CFS) digital signature scheme [9] and the Stern
identification scheme [23]. In this paper, we refer to this IBI scheme as mCFS-Stern-IBI. In [6],
Cayrel et al. proved that mCFS-Stern-IBI is secure under passive attacks.
Our Contributions. In this paper, we revisit several existing identification schemes based on
algebraic coding theory, including the Stern identification scheme and the mCFS-Stern-IBI scheme.
We also provide a new security analysis for the mCFS-Stern-IBI scheme by showing that it can in
fact achieve active security. However, we show that it is difficult to extend the proof to obtain the
concurrent security (i.e. the highest level of security) of the scheme.
One widely used approach to transform a passive secure IBI scheme into a concurrent secure
one is to use the OR-proof technique. However, due to the special design of the mCFS-Stern-IBI
scheme, the conventional OR-proof transformation does not work. We then design a new OR-proof
system for this particular IBI and obtain a new scheme which is proven secure under concurrent
attacks.

2

Preliminaries

In this section, we review the definition and security model for identity based identification schemes.
We follow the IBI definition and security model in [1].
2.1

IBI Definition

Definition 1. An identity-based identification (IBI) scheme consists of four probabilistic polynomialtime (PPT) algorithms (MKGen, UKGen, P, V).
1. MKGen: On input 1k , where k ∈ N is a security parameter, it generates a master public/secret
key pair (mpk, msk).
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2. UKGen: On input msk and some identity I ∈ {0, 1}∗ , it outputs a user secret key usk[I].
3. (P, V) – User Identification Protocol: The prover with identity I runs algorithm P with initial
state usk[I], and the verifier runs V with initial state (mpk, I). The first and last messages of
the protocol belong to the prover. The protocol ends when V outputs either ‘accept’ or ‘reject’.
Completeness: For all k ∈ N, I ∈ {0, 1}∗ , (mpk, msk) ← MKGen(1k ), and usk[I] ← UKGen(msk, I),
an honest V who is initialized with (mpk, I) always outputs ‘accept’ at the end of the identification
protocol after communicating with P who is honest and initialized with usk[I].
2.2

IBI Security Model

There are three security notions for IBI schemes: impersonation under passive (id-imp-pa), active
(id-imp-aa) and concurrent (id-imp-ca) attacks.
Definition 2 (id-imp-pa). For an IBI scheme (MKGen, UKGen, P, V), consider the following game
between a simulator S and an adversary A.
1. S generates a master key pair (mpk, msk) ← MKGen(1k ) and gives mpk to A. S also maintains
two user sets: HU and CU, which stand for Honest Users and Corrupted Users, respectively.
Initially, both HU and CU are empty.
2. A can make queries to the following oracles:
(a) INIT(I) – create a user with identity I: If I ∈ HU ∪ CU , ⊥ is returned indicating that
I has already been created. Otherwise, usk[I] ← UKGen(msk, I) is executed and I is added
into HU. A symbol ‘1’ is returned to the adversary indicating that the creation is successful.
(b) CORR(I) – corrupt a user with identity I: If I ∈
/ HU , ⊥ is returned, otherwise, I is deleted
from HU and added into CU, and usk[I] is returned to A.
(c) CONV(I) – get a conversation between user I (the prover) and a verifier: If I ∈
/ HU , ⊥ is
returned, otherwise, a conversation between I (with initial state usk[I]) and a verifier (with
initial state (mpk, I)) is returned to A.
3. A can adaptively query INIT, CORR and CONV, and then outputs an identity Ib ∈ HU , which
corresponds to the user that A wants to impersonate. After receiving Ib , the simulator removes
Ib from HU and adds it into CU.
4. A runs the user identification protocol with a verifier V (initialized with (mpk, Ib )). A can
continue to make INIT, CORR and CONV queries. The simulator halts when V outputs ‘accept’
or ‘reject’.
The advantage of the adversary A is defined as
Advid-imp-pa
(k) = Pr[V outputs ‘accept’].
A
An IBI scheme (MKGen, UKGen, P, V) is said to be id-imp-pa secure if Advid-imp-pa
(k) is negligible4
A
for any probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary A.
The id-imp-aa and id-imp-ca security. The id-imp-aa security is defined via a similar game,
except that the conversation oracle CONV is replaced by a proving oracle PROV. When querying
this oracle, A provides an identity I ∈ HU to the simulator and then acts as a (malicious) verifier to
communicate with the prover P(usk[I]) simulated by S. The difference between active (id-imp-aa)
and concurrent (id-imp-ca) attack is that in the former adversarial model, A can only have one
ongoing session with one proving oracle at a time, but in the concurrent model, A can have parallel
and concurrent sessions with one proving oracle.
4

A function  : N → R is negligible if for every constant c ≥ 0, there exists an integer kc such that (k) < k−c for
all k ≥ kc .
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3

Public Key Cryptosystems Based on Algebraic Coding Theory

Let F2 denote the finite field with two elements {0, 1}. In this paper, we use C to denote a binary
linear code of length n and dimension k, which is a subspace of dimension k of the vector space Fn2 .
We call elements of F2n words, and elements of C codewords. A code is usually given in the form
of a generating matrix G, lines of which form a basis of the code. The parity check matrix H is a
dual form of this generating matrix: it is the (n − k) × n matrix which is a generator matrix of the
dual code of C. When we multiply a word by the parity check matrix we obtain what is called a
syndrome which has the length of n − k bits. The security of code-based cryptosystems are based
on the intractability of the following problems.
Syndrome decoding problem. Given a random r × n binary matrix H̄, an integer ω > 0, and
a binary vector s ∈ Fr2 , is there a word x ∈ Fn2 of weight at most ω such that H̄xT = s?
The variant of the syndrome decoding problem in which we ask for an x with exactly ω 1’s is
NP-complete [4]. It is conjectured that the syndrome decoding problem is also NP-complete.
Bounded decoding problem. Given an integer d, a random r×n binary matrix H̄ such that every
d − 1 columns of H̄ are linearly independent, a binary vector s ∈ Fr2 , and an integer ω ≤ (d − 1)/2,
is there a word x ∈ Fn2 of weight at most ω such that H̄xT = s?
Goppa Code distinguishing problem. Given a r × n binary matrix H̄, decide whether H̄ is a
random binary matrix or H̄ is a random parity check matrix for a Goppa code.
3.1

The Niederreiter Cryptosystem

In [18], Niederreiter proposed a public key cryptosystem which is a variant of the first code-based
cryptosystem by McElliece [17]. Let C0 denote a t-error correcting Goppa code, and H0 a parity
check matrix of C0 . The public key is obtained by H = V H0 P where V is an (n − k) × (n − k) nonsingular matrix and P is an n × n permutation matrix. The corresponding secret key is (V, H0 , P ).
The encryption c of a message m ∈ Fn2 (m has Hamming weight at most t) is simply c = HmT ∈
n−k
F2 . To decrypt a ciphertext c,
1. compute α = V −1 c = H0 P mT ;
2. apply the syndrome decoding procedure for C0 to α and obtain β = P mT ;
3. retrieve the message m via mT = P −1 β.
3.2

The Courtois–Finiasz–Sendrier Signature Scheme

In [8], Courtois, Finiasz and Sendrier proposed the first practical code-based signature scheme based
on the Niederreiter cryptosystem presented above. The idea is to apply the Full Domain Hash [2,
3] to the Niederreiter cryptosystem.
Let H and (V, H0 , P ) denote the user public and private key in the Niederreiter Cryptosystem.
To generate a signature for a message m, the signing algorithm works as follows:
– Set an initial counter i = 0;
– Compute s = h(m, i) using a cryptographic hash function h : {0, 1}∗ → F2n−k ;
– Use the decryption algorithm to find x such that HxT = s. If no such x is found, set i = i + 1
and go back to step 2.
– Output (x, i) as the signature.
To verify a signature (x, i) for a message m:
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– Compute s = HxT and s0 = h(m, i);
– If s = s0 , return true; otherwise, return false.
In [8], it has been shown that if we use t-error correcting Goppa code, then the probability that
a random syndrome is decodable is about t!1 .
A Variant. In [9], Dallot proposed a slight modified version of the CFS scheme where the counter i
is randomly selected from {1, 2, · · · , 2n−k }. It has been proven in [9] that the modified CFS (mCFS)
scheme is strongly unforgeable under adaptive chosen message attacks.
Theorem 1 ([9]). The modified CFS digital signature scheme is strongly unforgeable under adaptive chosen message attacks.
3.3

The Stern Identification Scheme

In [22, 23], Stern introduced a standard identification scheme based on the syndrome decoding
problem.
Let H denote a random (n − k) × n matrix over F2 . This matrix is public. Each user receives
an n-bit secret key s of weight t. The user public key is pk = HsT . To identify him/herself to a
verifier who has pk, the prover runs the identification protocol as follows:
V(pk = HsT )

P(s)
randomly select y ∈ Fn
2 , and
permutation σ over {1, 2, · · · , n}
c1 = ĥ(σ, Hy T )
c2 = ĥ(σ(y))
c3 = ĥ(σ(y ⊕ s))

c1 , c2 , c3

R

b ← {0, 1, 2}

b


if b = 0, Rsp = (y, σ)
if b = 1, Rsp = (y ⊕ s, σ)
if b = 2, Rsp = (σ(y), σ(s))

Rsp

If b = 0, verify c1 and c2
If b = 1, verify c1 and c3
If b = 2, verify c2 and c3

repeat the above protocol for r times
(When b = 1, Hy T can be derived from Hy T = H(y ⊕ s)T ⊕ pk)
Fig. 1. The Stern Identification Protocol

The Stern Identification Protocol
1. The prover chooses randomly a word y ∈ Fn2 and a permutation σ of {1, 2, · · · , n}, and sends
to the verifier c1 , c2 , c3 such that
c1 = ĥ(σ, Hy T ), c2 = ĥ(σ(y)), c3 = ĥ(σ(y ⊕ s)).
where ĥ denotes a cryptographic hash function.
2. Upon receiving (c1 , c2 , c3 ), the verifier randomly selects b ∈ {0, 1, 2} and sends b to the prover.
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3. Based on the value of b, the prover responds as follows
– If b = 0, the prover reveals y and σ;
– If b = 1, the prover reveals y ⊕ s and σ;
– If b = 2, the prover reveals σ(y) and σ(s).
4. Upon receiving the response,
– If b = 0, the verifier verifies c1 and c2 ;
– If b = 1, the verifier verifies c1 and c3 ;
– If b = 2, the verifier verifies c2 and c3 .
5. Repeat the above steps for r times.
During the fourth Step, when b = 1, it can be noticed that Hy T can be derived from H(y ⊕ s)T
by
Hy T = H(y ⊕ s)T ⊕ HsT = H(y ⊕ s)T ⊕ pk.
It has been shown in [23] that the above identification scheme is a zero-knowledge Proof-ofKnowledge (PoK) with knowledge error (2/3)r . In particular, three strategies (Fig. 2) have been
presented in [23] for an adversary to impersonate a given identity without knowing the secret key.
Each impersonation strategy has a success probability of 2/3.

1. Generating y and σ according to the scheme and replacing the unknown secret key
s by some arbitrary vector v of weight t, then computing the various commitments.
By doing this, the false prover hopes that b is 0 or 2. In the first case, he can simply
disclose y and σ and in the second case, he returns σ(y) and σ(v). On the other hand,
he is unable to answer when b = 1.
2. A similar strategy can be defined with y ⊕ s in place of y. In this case, the false prover
hopes that b is 1 or 2.
3. Having σ and both y and y ⊕ v ready where v is some element such that Hv T = pk
(there is no requirement on the weight of v). This strategy expects that b is 0 or 1.
Fig. 2. Impersonation strategies for the Stern identification scheme.

3.4

Identity Based Variants of The Stern Identification Scheme

In [23], Stern also introduced an identity based variant of his identification scheme. But no formal
security analysis has been provided in [23] for the IBI scheme. In [7, 6], Cayrel et al. combined
the modified CFS signature scheme [9] and the Stern identification scheme to construct a new IBI
scheme (i.e. mCFS-Stern-IBI).
The mCFS-Stern-IBI Scheme
– MKGen: run the key generation algorithm of the modified CFS signature scheme to generate a
signing and verification key pair (sk, vk). Set mpk = vk, and msk = sk.
– UKGen: run the signing algorithm of the modified CFS signature scheme to generate a signature
(x, i) on a user identity I. Set usk[I] = (x, i).
– P, V: run the Stern identification protocol where P is initialized with x and V is initialized with
h(I, i) (i is sent to the verifier in the first message of the protocol).
We can see that h(I, i) in fact serves as the “public key” of the user in the Stern identification
scheme. Cayrel et al. [6] proved that the above IBI scheme is id-imp-pa secure.
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7

A New Security Proof for The mCFS-Stern-IBI Scheme

We provide a new security proof for the mCFS-Stern-IBI scheme [7, 6] reviewed in the previous
section. We show that the scheme is in fact id-imp-aa secure.
Theorem 2. The mCFS-Stern-IBI is secure under active attacks.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Given an adversary A against the mCFS-Stern-IBI in id-imp-aa
game, we construct a forger F against the mCFS signature scheme. F is given the public key vkmCFS
of the mCFS signature scheme. F sets mpk = vkmCFS and passes mpk to A. F then simulates the
id-imp-aa game as follows.
Suppose A issues at most qinti INTI queries. F randomly selects an index ` in {1, 2, · · · , qinti }.
For the j-th INTI query made by A where j 6= `, F queries the signing oracle to generate a
signature (xj , ij ) for IDj . For the `-th INTI query, F randomly selects i` ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 2n−k }. Notice
that according to the analysis given in [8],
Pr[h(ID` , i` ) is decodable] =

1
.
t!

When A issues a corruption query to any IDj such that IDj 6= ID` , F returns (xj , ij ) to A. If
A issues a corruption query to ID` (denote this event by Abort1 ), F aborts the game without any
output. Then we have
1
Pr[Abort1 ] ≤
.
qinti
To simulate the PROV oracle for user ID` , F works as follows. At the beginning of each
round, F chooses at random one of the three cheating strategies described in Sec. 3.3 and prepares
the initial commitments c1 , c2 , c3 according to the chosen strategy. Now, each strategy allows to
successfully answer two of the three challenges issued by A. In case A asks a challenge which F
cannot answer, F resets A for the current round. The reset will continue until F can successfully
answer A’s challenge, or number of reset reaches a limit λ (to be determined shortly). In the latter
case, F aborts the game without any output. Denote the event that F aborts the game when
simulating a PROV oracle for ID` by Abort2 . Then by the union bound we have
1
Pr[Abort2 ] ≤ qprov r( )λ
3
where qprov denotes the number of PROV queries A would ask. In order to make Pr[Abort2 ] ≤ 1/3,
we can set λ = log3 qprov r + 1.
Under the condition that F does not abort the game in the simulation, and h(ID` , i` ) is decodable (which happens with probability t!1 ), then the simulation is perfect.
Now suppose the adversary A can impersonate the user ID` with a non-negligible probability,
the following Lemma by Stern shows that there exists a polynomial-time algorithm which can
extract the user secret key x` of ID` also with a non-negligible probability.
Lemma 1 (Lemma 1 of [23]). Assume there exists a PPT adversary which can impersonate an
uncorrupted user with probability (2/3)r + , then there exists a polynomial-time algorithm which
can extract the user secret key with probability at least 3 /10.
After obtaining the valid user secret key x` for ID` , F outputs (x` , i` ) as the forgery for the
message ID` .
t
u
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On the Concurrent Security. The above proof for active security cannot be easily extended to
prove the concurrent security of the scheme. When we simulate the PROV oracle in the concurrent
security game, recursive rewinding may occur. We leave the id-imp-ca security of the mCFS-SternIBI scheme as an open problem.

5

A New Code-based IBI Scheme Secure under Concurrent Attacks

Given that we are unable to directly prove the id-imp-ca security of the mCFS-Stern-IBI scheme,
a natural question is if we can construct an id-imp-ca secure variant of it. A popular way to
transform an id-imp-pa secure identification scheme into an id-imp-ca secure one is to use the ORproof technique [16, 12]. So we start with an OR-proof variant of the mCFS-Stern-IBI scheme.
5.1

The First OR-proof Variant

To apply the OR-proof technique as shown in [16, 12], we modify Cayrel et al.’s IBI [7, 6] scheme
in the following way: we first generate two valid signatures (x0 , i0 ) and (x1 , i1 ) for a user identity
I, and then toss a coin $ and set usk[I] = ($, x$ , i0 , i1 ). During the identification phase, the user
proves that he knows at least one valid secret key with respect to h(I, i0 ) or h(I, i1 ). The detailed
scheme is presented below.
The OR-proof Protocol
1. The prover first randomly chooses b1−$ ∈ {0, 1, 2}. Based on the values of b1−$ and h(I, i1−$ ),
randomly select an impersonation strategy given in Fig. 2 (e.g. if b1−$ = 0, choose either strat). Based on h(I, i$ ) and x$ ,
egy 1 or strategy 3) and prepare the commitment (c11−$ , c21−$ , c1−$
3
$ , c$ ) according to the original Stern identification protocol. Send (i , c0 , c0 , c0 , i ,
prepare (c$
,
c
0 1 2 3 1
1
2
3
c11 , c12 , c13 ) to the verifier.
2. Upon receiving (i0 , c01 , c02 , c03 , i1 , c11 , c12 , c13 ), the verifier randomly selects b ∈ {0, 1, 2} and sends b
to the prover.
3. The prover computes the response for b1−$ w.r.t. h(I, i1−$ ) based on the impersonation strategy
chosen in the first step. The prover then computes b$ = b − b1−$ mod 3, and computes the
response for b$ w.r.t. h(I, i$ ) according to the original Stern identification protocol.
4. Upon receiving the response, the verifier checks that b0 + b1 = b mod 3 and the response Rsp0
for h(I, i0 ) w.r.t. b0 , and the response Rsp1 for h(I, i1 ) w.r.t. b1 , are both correct.
5. Repeat the above steps for r times.
Security Analysis. The above OR-proof approach has been widely applied in the design of
id-imp-ca secure IBI schemes [16, 24, 12]. However, when we apply this approach to the mCFS-SternIBI scheme, we found that the derived IBI scheme is insecure at all. An adversary can impersonate
the prover by selecting one impersonation strategy (Fig. 2) for h(I, i0 ), and another one for h(I, i1 ).
Take as an example, the adversary chooses strategy 1 for h(I, i0 ), and strategy 2 for h(I, i1 ). That
means the attacker can pass the verification if b0 ∈ {0, 2} and b1 ∈ {1, 2}. The problem is that
for any b ∈ {0, 1, 2}, the adversary can simply find a pair of b0 ∈ {0, 2} and b1 ∈ {1, 2} such that
b0 + b1 = b mod 3. It is easy to verify that the attack works no matter which two impersonation
strategies the adversary chooses.
5.2

A New OR-proof Variant

Difficulties in obtaining a three-move protocol. The problem of the first OR-proof scheme
is that the adversary has too much “freedom” in answering the challenge sent by the verifier.
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To solve the problem, we need a way to restrict the adversary’s freedom while at the same time
preserve completeness (i.e. the real prover can always complete the protocol successfully). If we
revisit the attack against the first OR-proof protocol, we observe that when the adversary chooses
two impersonation strategies for h(I, i0 ) and h(I, i1 ), for example b0 ∈ {0, 2} and b1 ∈ {1, 2}, then
b0 + b1 ∈ {1, 2, 0, 1}. If we require the adversary to provide responses for two different b0 and b00 , and
also responses for two different b1 and b01 , such that b0 + b1 = b and b00 + b01 = b, then the probability
that the adversary can cheat is 1/3 (in the example, the adversary can provide the responses only
when b = 1). On the other hand, a real prover who has one valid secret key can provide responses
for any challenge b ∈ {0, 1, 2}.
The above observation shows that by requiring the prover to provide two responses for one
challenge, we can enhance the “soundness” of the protocol. However, this approach is insecure
either, since it will allow the verifier to easily obtain the user secret key (i.e., the protocol is not
“witness hiding”). It is easy to see that if the prover provides the responses for both b0 and b00 (or
b1 and b01 ), then the verifier is able to derive the secret key w.r.t. h(I, i0 ) (or h(I, i1 )). In the Stern
identification scheme, the responses have the form (y, σ), (y ⊕ s, σ), and (σ(y), σ(s)). If the prover
sends any two responses to the verifier, then the verifier can derive the value of the secret key s
easily.
In summary, to provide the soundness property, we must use two response pairs in the protocol.
However, if the prover sends both response pairs in one move, then the protocol will lose the witness
hiding property. It seems difficult to reconcile the conflict in a three-move protocol. To resolve the
problem, we should let the prover only send either the response pair for b0 and b1 or the response
pair for b00 and b01 , but at the same time demonstrate that he/she can produce valid response pairs
for both cases. This can be done by applying an additional challenge-response phase, that is, the
verifier will select another random challenge bit ρ ∈ {0, 1}, and based on the value of ρ, the prover
reveals one of the two response pairs to the verifier. The details are given below.
Code-IBI: A New Variant of mCFS-Stern-IBI
– MKGen: run the key generation algorithm of the modified CFS signature scheme to generate a
signing and verification key pair (sk, vk). Set mpk = vk, and msk = sk.
– UKGen: run the signing algorithm of the modified CFS signature scheme twice to generate two
different signatures (x0 , i0 ) and (x1 , i1 ) (i0 6= i1 ) for a user identity I, and then toss a coin $
and set usk[I] = ($, x$ , i0 , i1 ).
– (P, V): initialize P with usk[I], and V with I. Then run the following identification protocol.
1. The prover first randomly chooses two different b1−$ , b01−$ ∈ {0, 1, 2}. Based on the values of
b1−$ , b01−$ , select for h(I, i1−$ ) the impersonation strategy given in Fig. 2 (e.g. if b1−$ = 0
and b01−$ = 1, choose strategy 3) and prepare the commitment (c11−$ , c21−$ , c31−$ ). Based on
$ $
h(I, i$ ) and x$ , prepare (c$
1 , c2 , c3 ) according to the original Stern identification protocol.
0
0
0
1
1
1
Send (i0 , c1 , c2 , c3 , i1 , c1 , c2 , c3 ) to the verifier.
2. Upon receiving (i0 , c01 , c02 , c03 , i1 , c11 , c12 , c13 ), the verifier randomly selects b ∈ {0, 1, 2} and sends
b to the prover.
3. The prover computes the responses Rsp1−$ and Rsp01−$ for h(I, i1−$ ) w.r.t. b1−$ and b01−$
based on the impersonation strategy chosen in the first step. The prover then computes
b$ = b − b1−$ mod 3 and b0$ = b − b01−$ mod 3, and computes the responses Rsp$ and
Rsp0$ for h(I, i$ ) w.r.t. b$ and b0$ according to the original Stern identification protocol.
4. The prover sends (b0 , b1 ) and (b00 , b01 ) to the verifier.
5. The verifier checks that b0 6= b00 , b1 6= b01 , b0 + b1 = b mod 3, b00 + b01 = b mod 3. Then the
verifier randomly chooses a bit ρ ∈ {0, 1} and sends it to the prover.
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6. If ρ = 0, the prover sends Rsp0 and Rsp1 to the verifier; otherwise, if ρ = 1, the prover sends
Rsp00 and Rsp01 to the verifier.
7. Upon receiving the response, the verifier checks that Rsp0 and Rsp1 w.r.t. b0 and b1 (if ρ = 0),
or Rsp00 and Rsp01 w.r.t. b00 and b01 (if ρ = 1), are correct.
8. Repeat the above steps for r times.
P($, x$ , i0 , i1 )

V(ID)

Randomly choose different b1−$ , b01−$ ∈ {0, 1, 2}.
This determines an impersonate strategy
for h(ID, i1−$ ) given in Fig. 2.
Compute c1−$
, c1−$
, c1−$
1
2
3
based on the chosen impersonation strategy.
n
Randomly select y ∈ F2
Randomly select permutation σ over {1, 2, · · · , n}
T
c$
1 = ĥ(σ, Hy )
$
c2 = ĥ(σ(y))
c$
i0 , c01 , c02 , c03 , i1 , c11 , c12 , c13
3 = ĥ(σ(y ⊕ x$ ))

-

R

b ← {0, 1, 2}

b

b$ = b − b1−$ mod 3

b0$ = b − b01−$ mod 3
Compute Rsp1−$ , Rsp01−$
for b1−$ and b01−$ based on
chosen impersonation strategy.
Compute Rsp$ (and Rsp0$ resp.)
for b$ (and b0$ resp.) as follows
if b$ (b0$ ) = 0, Rsp$ (Rsp0$ ) = (y, σ)
if b$ (b0$ ) = 1, Rsp$ (Rsp0$ ) = (y ⊕ x$ , σ)
if b$ (b0$ ) = 2, Rsp$ (Rsp0$ ) = (σ(y), σ(x$ ))

b0 , b1 , b00 , b01

if ρ = 0, Rsp = Rsp0 , Rsp∗ = Rsp1
if ρ = 1, Rsp = Rsp00 , Rsp∗ = Rsp01

Check b0 6= b00 , b1 6= b01
b0 + b1 = b mod 3
b00 + b01 = b mod 3
R

ρ ← {0, 1}

ρ


Rsp, Rsp∗

-

If ρ = 0
If b0 (b1 ) = 0,
If b0 (b1 ) = 1,
If b0 (b1 ) = 2,
If ρ = 1
If b00 (b01 ) = 0,
If b00 (b01 ) = 1,
If b00 (b01 ) = 2,

check c01 (c11 ) and c02 (c12 )
check c01 (c11 ) and c03 (c13 )
check c02 (c12 ) and c03 (c13 )
check c01 (c11 ) and c02 (c12 )
check c01 (c11 ) and c03 (c13 )
check c02 (c12 ) and c03 (c13 )

repeat the above protocol for r times
Fig. 3. Code-IBI: A Variant of mCFS-Stern-IBI with Concurrent Security

Now let’s revisit the impersonation attack against the first OR-proof given in Sec. 5.1. Assume
the adversary chooses impersonation strategy 1 (Fig. 2) for h(I, i0 ), and strategy 2 for h(I, i1 ).
That means the attacker can pass the verification if b0 , b00 ∈ {0, 2} and b1 , b01 ∈ {1, 2}. So if the
challenge b = 1, then the adversary can successfully pass the verification by setting b0 = 0, b00 = 2
and b1 = 1, b01 = 2. However, if b = 0 or b = 2, then the adversary only has probability 1/2 to pass
the verification. That means the probability that the adversary can impersonate an uncorrupted
user in one round is bounded by 31 · 1 + 32 · 12 = 23 . The result shown in the following Theorem
coincides with this informal analysis.
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Theorem 3. The new identification protocol (P, V) is a proof of knowledge system with knowledge
error (2/3)r .
Proof. In the proposed Code-IBI scheme (Fig. 3), the challenge space becomes (b, ρ) ∈ {(0, 0), (0, 1),
(1, 0), (1, 1), (2, 0), (2, 1)}. Consider the tree T (ω) of all 6r executions corresponding to all possible
questions of the verifier when the adversary has a fixed random tape ω. Now a vertex with at least
5 children corresponds to a situation where a commitment (i0 , c01 , c02 , c03 , i1 , c11 , c12 , c13 ) has been made
and the adversary can provide answers to at least 5 possible challenges of the verifier.
Lemma 2. If there exists an adversary A which can impersonate an uncorrupted user with probability (2/3)r + , then there exists a polynomial time algorithm which can find a vertex with five
children with probability at least 3 /10.
Proof. The proof follows the same technique as used in [23]. The difference is that now we are
dealing with a 6-ary tree instead of a 3-ary tree. Suppose there exists an adversary A that can
impersonate an uncorrupted user with probability (2/3)r + , we construct an polynomial time
algorithm to find a vertex with at least five children as follows:
1. Randomly select a random tape ω for the adversary A. This defines an execution tree T (ω).
2. Randomly select a sequence for the verifier’s queries. This defines a branch B of T (ω).
3. Visit all the vertices along the selected branch B. If a vertex with at least five children is found
at level i, return (ω, B, i); else, return ⊥.
Analysis. Consider the set X defined by

X = {ω|T (ω) has at least 4r + 6r branches}.
2
Then the probability that a random ω falls in X is at least /2. Otherwise, we can bound the overall
successful probability of A by
Pr[A is successful] = Pr[A is successful ∧ ω ∈ X] + Pr[A is successful ∧ ω ∈
/ X]
≤ Pr[ω ∈ X] + Pr[A is successful|ω ∈
/ X]

4 r 
< +( ) +
2
6
2
2 r
=( ) +
3
So by contradiction, the probability that a random ω falls in X is at least /2. Now, Since T (ω)
has at least 4r + /2 · 6r branches, the probability that the branch B we selected in step 2 of our
algorithm corresponds to a successful execution is at least (4/6)r + /2.
For any level i, 0 ≤ i ≤ r, we let ni denote the number of vertices at level i, and for 0 ≤ i < r,
we define αi = ni+1 /ni . Then we have
r−1
Y
i=0


αi ≥ 4r + 6r .
2

Taking logarithms, this yields
r−1
X
i=0






log4 (αi ) ≥ log4 (4r + 6r ) ≥ log4 ((1 − )4r + 6r ) ≥ (1 − )r + r log4 6
2
2
2
2
2
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where the last inequality is based on the convexity inequality. Hence, one of the log4 (αi )’s must
exceed


log 3 − 1
1 − + log4 6 = 1 +

2 2
4
which implies
log 3−1
log 3−1
log 3−1
log 3−1
αi ≥ 41+ 4  = 22+ 2  = 4 · 2 2  = 4 · eln 2 2  .
From the inequality ex ≥ 1 + x for all x ≥ 0 we have
αi ≥ 4 · (1 + ln 2

log 3 − 1
).
2

This indicates
ni+1 − 4ni ≥ (2 ln 2(log 3 − 1))ni .
Since each vertex at level i has at most 6 children, we have
Pr[a randomly selected vertex at level i has more than 4 child] ≥ ln 2(log 3 − 1).
Hence, the probability that we find a vertex with at least 5 children in step 3 of our algorithm is
at least ln 2(log 3 − 1).
Combining all together, the overall probability of our algorithm to find a vertex with at least 5
children is at least
/2 · ((4/6)r + /2) · (ln 2(log 3 − 1)) ≥ 3 /10.
t
u
Lemma 3. For any vertex in the tree T (ω), if the adversary can provide answers for at least 5
possible challenges of the verifier, then the adversary can provide answers for all possible challenges
w.r.t. either h(I, i0 ) and commitment c01 , c02 , c03 or h(I, i1 ) and commitment c11 , c12 , c13 in the Stern
identification scheme.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose the adversary can only provide answers for two different challenges x, x0 ∈ {0, 1, 2} w.r.t. h(I, i0 ) and c01 , c02 , c03 and answers for two different challenges
y, y 0 ∈ {0, 1, 2} w.r.t. h(I, i1 ) and c11 , c12 , c13 . Then {x + y, x + y 0 , x0 + y, x0 + y 0 } (mod 3) will cover the
set {0, 1, 2} and have exactly one number repeated once. Wlog, suppose (x, x0 ) = (0, 1) and (y, y 0 ) =
(1, 2), then (x + y, x + y 0 , x0 + y, x0 + y 0 ) = (1, 2, 2, 0) (mod 3), which means the adversary is able to
answer at most 4 different challenges among the challenge set {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1), (2, 0), (2, 1)}
defined by the challenge (b, ρ) sent by the verifier. More specifically, in this case the adversary is able
to produces responses for one of {(0, 0), (0, 1)}, one of {(1, 0), (1, 1)}, and both of {(2, 0), (2, 1)}. A
similar analysis can be done for other possible combinations of (x, x0 ) and (y, y 0 ).
t
u
Lemma 4. If there exists an adversary A which can provide answers for all possible challenges
w.r.t. h(I, i) and commitment c1 , c2 , c3 in the Stern identification protocol, then we can extract the
secret key x for pk = h(I, i).
The proof for Lemma 4 can be found in [23] (Theorem 1). Theorem 3 can be obtained immediately from Lemma 2–4.
t
u
Now, by combining Theorem 1 with Theorem 3, we can show that the Code-IBI scheme (Fig. 3)
is secure under concurrent attacks.
Theorem 4. The Code-IBI scheme is secure under concurrent attacks in the random oracle model.

Identity Based Identification from Algebraic Coding Theory

13

Proof. The proof is very similar to the proof of Theorem 2. Given an adversary A against the
Code-IBI scheme in the id-imp-ca security model, we construction a new adversary F against the
mCFS digital signature scheme in the strong unforgeability model.
Suppose A issues at most qinti INTI queries. F randomly selects an index ` in {1, 2, · · · , qinti }.
For the j-th INTI query made by A where j 6= `, F queries the signing oracle to generate two
signatures (xj0 , ij0 ) and (xj1 , ij1 ) where (ij0 6= ij1 ) for IDj , and then set the secret key of IDj by
following the normal procedures described in the UKGen algorithm. For the `-th INTI query, F
first queries the signing oracle to obtain a valid signature (x, i) for ID` . Then F randomly selects
i0 ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 2n−k }. Notice that according to the analysis given in [8],
Pr[h(ID` , i0 ) is decodable] =

1
.
t!

F then tosses a random coin $ and sets x`$ = x, i`$ = i and i`1−$ = i0 .
When A issues a corruption query to any IDj such that IDj 6= ID` , A returns the secret key of
IDj to A. If A issues a corruption query to ID` (denote this event by Abort1 ), F aborts the game
without any output. Then we have
1
.
Pr[Abort1 ] ≤
qinti
To simulate the PROV oracle for user ID` , F follows the protocol honestly since F has a valid
secret key of ID` . Under the condition that h(ID` , i`1−$ ) is decodable, the simulation is perfect.
Now suppose the adversary A can impersonate the user ID` with a non-negligible probability,
then according to Theorem 3, F can extract a valid secret key of ID` also with a non-negligible
probability. Since it has been shown in [23] that if we assume the hash function ĥ(·) is a random
oracle, then the simulated transcript w.r.t. h(ID` , i`1−$ ) is indistinguishable from the transcript
generated by using a secret key corresponding to h(ID` , i`1−$ ). Therefore, the Code-IBI scheme
is witness indistinguishable, and with probability 1/2, the user secret key extracted by F from A
constitutes a valid signature (x`1−$ , i`1−$ ) for ID` . Then F outputs (x`1−$ , i`1−$ ) as the forgery for
the message ID` and wins the strong unforgeability game.
t
u

6

Conclusion

In this paper, we revisited the Stern identification scheme and the mCFS-Stern-IBI scheme based
on algebraic coding theory. We provide a new security analysis for the mCFS-Stern-IBI scheme
by showing that the scheme can be proven secure against active adversaries whereas the previous
result only proves its passive security. We then further extend this IBI scheme to obtain concurrent
security by using a special OR-proof system. One interesting open problem is: Can we directly
prove the concurrent security of the mCFS-Stern-IBI scheme?
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